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Environmental Regulation and the Bankruptcy Act
Howard J. Wein*
INTRODUCTION
Environmental agencies have recently begun to grapple with the
growing problem of individuals and corporations seeking refuge
under the Federal Bankruptcy Act.' The question of whether a
bankruptcy court can and should act to enjoin a state from enforcing
its environmental laws is far from settled. While it may be true that
a court appointed trustee must comply with the laws of the state,'
the role of the bankruptcy court in restraining a state enforcement
action is less certain. Support can be found for the alternative prop-
ositions that (a) the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to interfere
with state enforcement actions,3 (b) the bankruptcy court may pos-
sess jurisdiction but should not interfere,4 and (c) the bankruptcy
court possesses jurisdiction and should interfere.5 The purpose of
this article is to consider the potential conflicts involving the Bank-
ruptcy Act and state regulatory programs designed to protect the
environment. We will consider the ways in which the courts perceive
the interface of the state regulatory authority and the Bankruptcy
Act, and how this could be changed by pending legislation.
THE BANKRUPTCY FRAMEWORK
The Bankruptcy Act arises from a specific grant of authority in
the federal constitution, empowering the Congress "To establish
. . .uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies."6 The Act is set
up under two major areas: (1) the liquidation provisions, also known
* The author is a graduate of George Washington University, and received his legal educa-
tion at the University of Pittsburgh. He is currently serving as Assistant Attorney General of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources.
1. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544-66, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as the Bankruptcy Act].
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1970); Gillis v. California, 293 U.S. 62 (1934).
3. See In re Dolly Madison Industries, Inc., 504 F.2d 499 (3d Cir. 1974).
4. See In re Diversa-Graphics, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 194 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1976).
5. See In re Hillsdale Foundry Co., 2 Collier Bankr. Cases 546, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 195
(W.D. Mich. 1974).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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as straight bankruptcy; and (2) the rehabilitation and reorganiza-
tion provisions which seek to prevent outright liquidation of assets.7
Courts of bankruptcy, created by the Bankruptcy Act,' are vested
with jurisdiction in law and in equity to take steps necessary to
enforce the provisions of the Act In Katchen v. Landy,10 the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the principal that bankruptcy
courts possess original jurisdiction to conduct proceedings under the
Bankruptcy Act, and can exercise summary jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate controversies relating to property over which they have actual
or constructive possession." Despite the clear language of Katchen,
however, there has arisen a question as to the bankruptcy court's
power under circumstances relating to the police power of a state
or municipality.
THE FRAMEWORK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
A. The Police Power as a Source of the State's Authority
Police power is the authority by which a state legislates for the
public good. It is derived from the sovereignty of the state, has been
held to be one of the least limitable of the governmental powers,2
and has been upheld in a wide variety of circumstances.' 3 The Su-
preme Court, speaking about police power, promulgated the classic
test of the propriety of a legislative action: "It must appear-first,
that the interests of the public require such interference; and second
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."" The
Court went on to say:
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power
have been a fruitful subject of discussion. . . . It is universally
conceded to include everything essential to the public safety,
7. 1 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 0.01 (14th ed. 1973).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a).
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 11(a)(1); (a)(2); (a)(5); (a)(9); (a)(15); 61 and 66.
10. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
11. Id. at 327.
12. See Queenside Hills Realty v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
13. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133
(1899); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Phalen v. Virginia,
49 U.S. (14 How.) 193 (1850).
14. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
Vol. 17: 133
Bankruptcy Act
health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abate-
ment, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded
as a public nuisance. Under this power . . . the State may
interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this
particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legisla-
ture to determine, not only what interests of the public require,
but what measures are necessary for the protection of such
interests.'
5
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld state and municipal
regulatory programs as a valid exercise of the police power," and it
is this broadly applied power that forms the foundation of a state's
environmental laws. 1
B. The State's Exercise of the Police Power to Protect the
Environment
Pennsylvania, like most other states, possesses a comprehensive
legislative scheme for protection of the environment. The keystone
of this scheme can be found in a recent amendment to the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution which charges the Commonwealth with the re-
sponsibility for preserving and maintaining the state's natural re-
sources. '
In 1970, the Pennsylvania legislature created the Department of
Environmental Resources to enforce the various state environmen-
tal protection statutes.' These environmental laws establish a com-
15. Id. at 136.
16. See cases cited in note 13 supra.
17. The following cases indicate activities which have been held to be a reasonable exer-
cise of the police power: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646
(1978) (New York City's Landmark Commission can designate the Grand Central Terminal
an historic landmark and thereafter prohibit the construction of a multi story tower above
it); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (municipality can prohibit sand
and gravel operations beneath the water table within its borders); Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (city can regulate air pollution emanating from federally
licensed vessels); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (state entomologist can order the
cutting of red cedar trees to protect apple orchards from cedar rust disease); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (municipality can ban brickyards within its boundaries);
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (state official can destroy fish nets to enforce a New
York fish and game statute); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (state can ban the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors and a municipality can ban all pool halls);
Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (municipality can prohibit
fertilizer production or transportation within its boundaries).
18. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 [also known as the Environmental Amendment].
19. See the Administrative Code, Act of April 9, 1929, Pub. L. No. 177, as amended by
1978-79
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prehensive regulatory program designed to protect the environment
of Pennsylvania.2 The environmental protection statutes are not to
be viewed in isolation, however, the federal government has created
a body of law called environmental law and for each of the Penn-
sylvania statutes there exists a federal law22 which protects similar
environmental interests and relies upon the state to assume the
primary role in regulating those interests, 23 thereby buttressing the
state's role in environmental protection.
JURISDICTION-THE* BANKRUPTCY COURT OR STATE COURT
One of the sensitive issues facing a state environmental attorney
involves the spectre of the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court 24 as compared to the jurisdiction of state courts to enforce
state laws. The question that initially arises is whether the existence
of the bankruptcy proceeding insulates a debtor before the bank-
ruptcy court from a state action, or in the alternative, either forces
the state to institute the state action in the bankruptcy court or
requires that a state request that the bankruptcy court permit the
state to file an action in state court. This dilemma arises both in
the context of criminal and civil enforcement proceedings.
A. Criminal Offenses-The Supreme Court
It is universally recognized that the state's police power allows the
classification of certain offenses as crimes,2 and it would appear to
the Act of December 3, 1970, Pub. L. No. 834, No. 275, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-1 (Purdon
Supp. 1977-78).
20. The various statutes include, inter alia, The Act of June 22, 1937, Pub. L. No. 1987,
as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Purdon 1977) (Clean Streams Law); The Act of
January 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 2119, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4001 (Purdon 1977)
(Air Pollution Control Act); The Act of July 31, 1968, Pub. L. No. 788, No. 241, as amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6001 (Purdon 1977) (The Solid Waste Management Act); The Act
of May 31, 1945, Pub. L. No. 1198, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.1 (Purdon Supp.
1977-78) (The Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act).
21. See generally Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law, in
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 20 (1974).
22. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (Supp. 1978); the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C.A. § 1251 (Supp. 1978); Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C.A. § 1201 (Supp. 1978); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901
(1977).
23. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b) and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901(a)(4), 7401(a)(3) (Supp.
1978); 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (Supp. 1978).
24. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
25. See Moore v. People of the State of Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852), where the
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be folly to suggest that a particular debtor's status in a bankruptcy
proceeding could excuse the debtor from prosecution for the viola-
tion of a state's criminal statutes. But Pennsylvania's environmen-
tal laws, like those in most other states, also declare certain conduct
to be unlawful, subjecting the offender to, inter alia, criminal pro-
ceedings. 26 Is it proper then for a federal court, such as a bankruptcy
court, to enjoin a state proceeding for violation of environmental
laws?
In Fenner v. Boykin2 the United States Supreme Court held that
a federal court could enjoin state officers from instituting criminal
actions only when absolutely necessary for the protection of consti-
tutional rights, and only under "[e]xtraordinary circumstances
where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.
Ordinarily there should be no interference with such officers,"2 and
the court refused to grant the injunction. The next term the Su-
preme Court reiterated that principal in Massachusetts State
Grange v. Benton 2 when it affirmed the refusal of a lower court to
issue an injunction against Massachusetts state officials to stop
them from enforcing a state daylight-savings time statute. In
Fenner and Massachusetts State Grange the injunction sought was
against a state official or agency. This principal, however, has been
extended to the refusal to enjoin state criminal nuisance proceed-
ings.
Then, in Younger v. Harris,4' the Supreme Court held that federal
courts could not enjoin a state criminal proceeding unless at least
one of three specific requirements were met,3' or "where a person
about to be prosecuted can show that he will, if the proceeding in
the state court is not enjoined, suffer irreparable damages. 32 The
Court said that "[t]he power to make municipal regulations for the restraint and punish-
ment of crime, for the preservation of the health and morals of her citizens, and of the public
peace, has never been surrendered by the States, or restrained by the Constitution of the
United States." Id. at 18.
26. - PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.301, 691.307 (Purdon 1977).
27. 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
28. Id. at 243-44.
29. 272 U.S. 525 (1926).
30. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) provides, "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments.
32. 401 U.S. at 43.
1978-79
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Younger court explained that the "irreparable" injury must be
"both great and immediate" and the cost, anxiety, and inconveni-
ence of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution could
not by themselves be considered "irreparable. 3 3 In Huffman v. Pur-
sue, Ltd.34 the irreparable injury requirement was extended by the
Court beyond criminal actions when it refused to enjoin a state
court proceeding founded upon a violation of an Ohio nuisance stat-
ute. The Court said the state's interest in nuisance litigation is
likely to be every bit as great as it would be in a criminal proceed-
ing.35
B. Criminal Offenses-The Bankruptcy Court
Against this backdrop, the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern
District of New York refused a request by a debtor in a Chapter XI
proceeding3 to enjoin the Attorney General of New York from pro-
secuting a criminal action in In re Diversa-Graphics.37 At the time
the Chapter XI proceeding was filed by Diversa-Graphics, the dis-
trict court issued an order, consistent with the language of section
314 of the Bankruptcy Act, which enjoined the commencement or
continuation of any proceeding wherein the debtor was a defendant
or respondent until further decree by the bankruptcy court.38 The
issues raised in this case were whether the stay provisions incident
to a Chapter XI proceeding enable a bankruptcy court to issue an
injunction, and, if so, whether the stay provisions require the bank-
ruptcy court to intervene and grant injunctive relief with respect to
an existing criminal prosecution brought by the Attorney General
33. Id. at 46.
34. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
35. Id. at 604.
36. A proceeding commenced under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 701,
will often involve the continued operation of a business while an arrangement is worked out
to pay off the creditors. This is one of the rehabilitative chapters of the Bankruptcy Act. See
note 7 and accompanying text supra.
37. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 194 (S.D.N.Y. January 22, 1976).
38. Section 314 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970), states:
The court may, in addition to the relief provided by section 29 of this title and else-
where under this chapter, enjoin or stay until final decree the commencement or
continuation of suits other than suits to enforce liens upon the property of a debtor,
and may, upon notice and for cause shown, enjoin or stay until final decree any act or
the commencement or continuation of any proceeding to enforce any lien upon the
property of the debtor.
This language comports with the language of section 114 of a Chapter X proceeding, 11 U.S.C.
§ 514 (1970).
Vol. 17: 133
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after the Chapter XI petition was filed.
As to the first question, it was concluded that section 314 author-
ized the court to stay the proceedings,39 but reference was made to
Younger's requirement of "special circumstances"4 to deny the is-
suance of an injunction, even though the debtor argued that the
automatic stay provisions of Rule 11-44(a)4' brought it within one
of the specific exceptions. The Diversa-Graphics court held that
Rule 11-44(a) should not operate to stay criminal proceedings. It
further concluded that the fourth exception of Younger, where the
injury to a federal right could be shown to be great and immediate,
did not exist in this case. 3
In In re Albert Glenn Huffman," a bankrupt sought the protection
39. The court did not go into any detail in support of its conclusion. But see In re Dolly
Madison Industries, Inc., 504 F.2d 499 (3d Cir. 1974) and notes 58-64 and accompanying text
infra. In Dolly Madison, the Third Circuit held a court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin a state
in the exercise of its regulatory powers.
40. 401 U.S. at 37.
41. Rule 11-44(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) Stay of Actions and Lien Enforcement. A petition filed under Rule 11-6 or 11-7
shall operate as a stay of the commencement or the continuation of any court or other
proceeding against the debtor, or the enforcement of any judgment against him, or of
any act or the commencement or continuation of any court proceeding to enforce any
lien against his property, or of any court proceeding, except a case pending under
Chapter 10 of this title, for the purpose of the rehabilitation of the debtor or the
liquidation of his estate.
42. The Diversa-Graphics court addressed the argument that the automatic stay provi-
sions of Rule 11-44 broadened the statutory authority in § 314, 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970). The
court said:
I must construe the apparently broader language of Rule 11-44(a) in accordance with
the substantive limitations of the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act itself. So
while Section 311, 11 U.S.C. § 711 confers broad jurisdiction on the Bankruptcy Court
over the assets of the debtor, wherever located, it has been consistently held that that
Section and Section 314 gave the Court no jurisdiction to stay State Court proceedings
effectively, unless such proceedings would in such interference with or dimunition of
the debtor's property that the rehabilitative purpose of Chapter XI would be chilled.
See In Re Laufer, 230 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1956), Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Eon
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Since Rule 11-44(a) was meant not to expand
but merely to implement Sections 311 and 314 it cannot be considered an express
Congressional grant bringing it within 28 U.S.C. Section 2283.
2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 196.
43. The court, in strongly worded language, expressed its opinion of the relationship
between the police power and Chapter XI:
Chapter XI, granted its rehabilitative purpose, is not to be construed as insulating a
debtor from the exercise of the state's police power expressed in its penal enactments.
Public policy insists that transgressions of the criminal law be dealt with, and I find
no reason to protect this debtor merely because it seeks the benefit of Chapter XI relief.
Id. at 197.
44. 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 34 (E.D. Va. March 7, 1978).
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of the bankruptcy court to prevent extradition by use of a discharge
in bankruptcy. The bankrupt purchased a car in Tennessee and
completely destroyed it in an accident in Virginia. The Tennessee
bank holding security interest in the car caused a felony warrant to
be issued, alleging that the bankrupt had removed the car from the
state contrary to state law. The bankrupt, facing extradition from
Virginia, attempted to seek a declaratory judgment in order to dis-
solve the basis of the criminal action, but the bankruptcy court said
that it lacked jurisdiction to prevent the extradition and further
ruled that the dischargeability of a debt through bankruptcy had
nothing to do with alleged criminal acts . 5 This line of cases suggests
that an injunction should not issue where criminal offenses, such as
violations of environmental statutes, lie and a bankrupt debtor
should not be able to find refuge in the shroud of the Bankruptcy
Act.
C. Other Unlawful Acts
Often the unlawful or illegal acts may occur while the debtor
continues in business. 6 For example, a Chapter XI proceeding con-
templates rehabilitation rather than liquidation of all assets. Con-
tinued operation of an enterprise may be essential to generate the
necessary income to set up a satisfactory arrangement with credi-
tors. However, if the continued operation could create a violation of
law, some protection should be afforded to the public to insure that
violations of law do not occur. The purposes of sections 311 and 314
of Chapter XII are to prevent a creditor from defeating jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court over the debtor's property by instituting
another action in a different forum."S This objective should not enti-
tle a debtor-in-possession or a trustee to violate a valid state law."
45. Id. at 35.
46. Rule 11-23 states, "The court may authorize the trustee, receiver, or debtor in posses-
sion to conduct the business and manage the property of the debtor for such time and on such
conditions as may be in the best interest of the estate."
47. 11 U.S.C. § 711, 714 (1970). These sections are essentially the same as §§ 111 and 114
of Chapter XI proceedings, 11 U.S.C. §§ 511, 514 (1970).
48. See Teledyne Industries v. Eon Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), In re
Bargain City, 212 F. Supp. 111, 115 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1970) provides in relevant part, "A trustee ... appointed in any
cause pending in any court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall
manage and operate the property in his possession. . . according to the requirements of the
valid laws of the State in which the property is situated."
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In Gillis v. California" a trustee sought to have a reorganization
court enjoin a state licensing agency from requiring the debtor to file
a bond required by state law in order to carry on the business of
distributing fuel. The Supreme Court interpreted the predecessor of
the present 28 U.S.C. § 959 as requiring the trustee to file the bond
and obtain the license. Specifically, Gillis held that Congress was
empowered to require receivers in a conservation proceeding to
transact local business in accordance with state law.5 Gillis clearly
indicated that Congress, in enacting the Bankruptcy Act, did not
intend to vest bankruptcy courts with authority to frustrate the
state's ability to exercise its police powers.
The promulgation and enforcement of criminal statutes repre-
sents one method by which a state can exercise its police power. If
a state regulates an activity by requiring a license or permit for
lawful operation, the failure to operate in accordance with that li-
cense could subject the regulatee to suspension or revocation of its
operating license, possibly causing the closing of a facility. Addi-
tionally, an activity may have to make an expenditure to comply
with the laws. If that regulatee happens to be subject to a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, does that fact offer it any protection?
In In re Bay Ridge Inn, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 5
the New York State Liquor Authority cancelled the liquor license
of a bankrupt corporation because a custodian of the receiver offered
liquor for sale in violation of state law. Judge Augustus Hand, writ-
ing for the court, found the liquor license to be a privilege granted
by the State Liquor Agency and anything to which the trustee suc-
ceeded by way of permission to continue the liquor business was
regulated exclusively by the state liquor control laws.5 The Bay
Ridge court, in reversing the decision of the bankruptcy court which
had annulled the liquor license revocation, reasoned that "[a]ny
rights or privileges of the trustee were created by the New York
legislature and were subject to such conditions as it might im-
pose."5"
In In re Colonial Tavern v. Charles L. Byrne,55 an almost identical
50. 293 U.S. 62 (1934).
51. Id. at 66.
52. 94 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1938).
53. Id. at 557.
54. Id.
55. 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1976).
1978-79
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case, the district court cited Bay Ridge56 when it affirmed the bank-
ruptcy court's decision that it lacked the authority to enjoin a li-
censing board from enforcing its laws. The court concluded by say-
ing:
The force of Judge Hand's opinion is even more apparent in
the context of a Chapter XI proceeding, which is voluntary
... .If the debtor's position were to be adopted, Chapter XI
would provide an instantly available, cheap and easy sanctuary
from all state regulatory enforcement proceedings.
Nothing in the prior case law of § 314. . .suggests that the
Bankruptcy Act was ever intended by Congress to subvert the
valid police power of the states in this matter.57
The Third Circuit has also adopted the view espoused by the Bay
Ridge court and asserted by the Colonial Tavern court. In In re
Dolly Madison" the court had to decide whether a reorganization
court had summary jurisdictional power pursuant to Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act59 to order a state corporation commission to
reinstate a debtor's certificate of authority to do business in Vir-
ginia. The court analyzed the power of summary jurisdiction as that
of a court of equity which is derived from section 2(a)(15) of the
Act.60 This jurisdiction, according to the court, "is generally limited
to the adjudication of questions concerning (1) the administration
of the debtor's estate, and (2) the property in the court's actual or
constructive possession."'" The state commission had made no
claim against property of the debtor corporation. The mere fact that
the debtor's property may be effected by state law did not constitute
a claim against that property, and absent such a claim, summary
jurisdiction was unavailable.62
Dolly Madison was recently cited by the Bankruptcy Court in the
Western District of Pennsylvania." The debtor filed a complaint
56. "The basic holding of the [Bay Ridge] case, however, is that the powers of a Bank-
ruptcy Court do not extend to interference in the comprehensive regulatory laws of a state."
Id. at 45.
57. Id. at 45-46.
58. 504 F.2d 499 (3d Cir. 1974).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15) (1970).
61. 504 F.2d at 503.
62. Id. at 503-04.
63. In re A.H.-R.S. Coal Corp., No. 77-88 (W.D. Pa., May 9, 1978).
Vol. 17: 133
Bankruptcy Act
seeking an injunction against the Pennsylvania Department of En-
vironmental Resources to force the Department to reissue a mining
license that it had failed to renew, and to enjoin the Department
from enforcing its laws. Upon the filing of the complaint, the court
issued a temporary restraining order. The Department filed a mo-
tion to dismiss alleging, inter alia, that the court lacked jurisdiction.
The court, in citing Dolly Madison, conceded that failure to renew
the license effectively denied the use of the property, but it found
no claim against the property to exist, and therefore it held that it
lacked jurisdiction.4
Bay Ridge, Colonial Tavern, and Dolly Madison stand for the
proposition that a bankruptcy court should not interfere with a
state's regulatory program, and the Diversa-Graphics decision sug-
gests that a court could interfere but choose not to. In In re Hillsdale
Foundry Co.,6" we find a decision which indicates that a bankruptcy
court could and should interfere. The debtor in Hillsdale initiated
a Chapter XI proceeding and filed a complaint for a temporary order
against the State of Michigan and the Michigan attorney general to
restrain them from the commencement or continuation of any ac-
tion against the debtor, or from doing any act which might interfere
with the operation of the debtor's cupola foundry. In 1969, tests
performed by the State Department of Natural Resources indicated
excessive particulate levels at the foundry. In 1973 Hillsdale
Foundry agreed to cease operations by the end of the year. Then,
after two extensions were granted allowing operations until well into
1974, the matter was referred to the state attorney general who filed
a complaint for an injunction.
The bankruptcy court found Rule 11-44 so persuasive that it de-
termined that it lacked jurisdiction to overrule the blanket stay
issued at the commencement of the Chapter XI proceedings by the
bankruptcy court." The court felt that it would be difficult for one
of its officers to operate a business pursuant to a federal bankruptcy
court order, while being sued in state court for complying with an
order to operate the business as usual. The court recognized the
responsibilities involved, 7 but felt that since the state's officials
knew of the problem for seven years, it should not now shut down
64. Id.
65. 2 Collier Bankruptcy Cases 546, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 195 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
66. Id. at 198.
67. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (1970).
1978-79
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the debtor and deprive it of the "rights granted to it by Congress
under the Bankruptcy Act." 8
This decision has been criticized in both the Colonial Tavern and
Diversa-Graphics opinions.69 In an unreported bench opinion, the
district court recognized the importance of a state's right to enforce
its valid laws, and held that the parties would not be further stayed
from litigating the questions in state court. 0 The bankruptcy
judge's order upholding its original stay was temporarily set aside
to decide the state issues.7
A bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York recently
addressed this issue in In re Parkchester General Hospital.72 The
State Commissioner of Health in New York initiated a hearing to
revoke the hospital's operating certificate when a Chapter XI pro-
ceeding was commenced by the hospital. Consistent with Hillsdale
Foundry Co. and Diversa-Graphics, the court concluded that Rule
11-44 properly stayed the state administrative proceeding. This deci-
sion was based, contrary to Colonial Tavern and Dolly Madison, on
the premise that a license revocation clearly affects the debtor and
the debtor's property, and, under section 311 of the Act, is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Moreover, "high
quality health service was a matter of vital public concern"73 and
although sufficient cause existed to vacate the stay order as pro-
vided by Rule 11-44, the court chose not to immediately do so."
The foregoing cases reflect the ambiguous situation due to the
uncertainty that exists in the lower federal courts regarding state
regulation and the bankruptcy's court's jurisdiction.
THE IMPACT OF Perez v. Campbell
Perez v. Campbell75 represents the Supreme Court's analysis of a
state's regulatory power in relation to the Bankruptcy Act. In Perez
the Court was called upon to pass on the constitutionality of a
68. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 198.
69. 420 F. Supp. at 45; 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 6.
70. Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. People of the State of Michigan ex rel. Frank J. Kelley,
Bankruptcy No. NK-1462-B9 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 1974).
71. Id.
72. 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 292 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1978).
73. Id. at 293.
74. Id.
75. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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section of an Arizona Financial Responsibility Statute as tested by
the supremacy clause. The disputed section of the Financial Re-
sponsibility Statute involved the consequences of an unsatisfied
judgment arising from an automobile accident to a driver. If the
judgment against a motorist remained unsatisfied for sixty days or
more, the motorist's license and registration were subject to suspen-
sion, notwithstanding a discharge in bankruptcy following such
judgment. The Court concluded that the sole emphasis of the stat-
ute was to provide leverage for the collection of damages from driv-
ers who were either at fault or adjudged negligent.7" However, the
Court found that one of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act
was to give debtors a new opportunity in life, unhampered by the
pressures of pre-existing debt."
The Perez court went to great lengths to demonstrate that the
statute contained no provisions suspending driving privileges of
careless drivers, nor did it require such drivers to attend a driver
improvement course."' The contested section of the statute in Perez
clearly acted as a means to force one who otherwise would be dis-
charged by the Bankruptcy Act to pay for the damage to the other
party in the accident. The Court implied that had the purpose of
the state statute been to deter irresponsible driving, the statute
would have withstood such a constitutional attack.79 However, the
Perez court saw the statute as merely a powerful weapon for credi-
tors to use in circumvention of the Bankruptcy Act.
The invalid statute in Perez might be distinguished from state
environmental laws in that those laws protect the natural resources
for all citizens, much more akin to a highway safety act that would
have met the criterion in Perez and not a class of creditors that the
invalid Perez statute was designed to protect. Further, the protec-
tion of natural resources has also been declared by Congress to be a
matter of national priority.80 The federal environmental laws, inso-
76. 402 U.S. at 646-47. In looking at the purpose of the statute, the Court felt bound by
the interpretation of the Arizona Supreme Court. "The Financial Responsibility Act has for
its principal purpose the protection of the public using the highways from financial hardship
which may result from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons." Schecter
v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 280, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (1963).
77. 402 U.S. at 648.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 651.
80. See § 101(a) and (b) of the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (Supp. 1978);
Federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (Supp. 1978); § 1002(a) and (b) of the Resource
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far as they recognize the state's responsibility for protecting the
environment should, in any evaluation, be considered as part of the
full purpose of Congress and should provide additional impetus to
accept the right of a state to enforce those laws.
A QUESTION OF CLAIMS-In re Marcus
A state environmental statute may include a civil penalty provi-
sion as part of a state's enforcement options.8 Thus, the question
of penalties may also arise in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding
whereupon first blush the state in collecting these penalties may
appear to be a creditor that the Bankruptcy Act is designed to
protect.
In straight bankruptcy, section 63(a) of the Act 82 sets forth those
debts which may be provable against a bankrupt's estate, and as
stated in Collier, "only a provable debt, with certain exceptions
stated in the statute, subject to discharge. '8 3 Section 57(j)," how-
ever, defines those debts which shall not be allowed:
(j) Debts owing to the United States or to any State or any
subdivision thereof as a penalty of forfeiture shall not be al-
lowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained
by the act, transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty
or forfeiture arose, with reasonable and actual costs occasioned
thereby and such interest as may have accrued on the amount
of such loss according to law.
The interaction of these two sections and the possible impact
upon a civil penalty claim can be understood by analyzing In Re
Marcus5 and the authority for its decision. Prior to bankruptcy,
the State of California obtained a civil penalty judgment against
Marcus for violating state water pollution laws. The court first ad-
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6902 (Supp. 1978); §§ 101 and 102 of the
Surface Mining Act, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201 and 1202 (1977).
81. See § 605 of the Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.605 (Purdon 1977)
or § 9.1 of the Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4009.1 (Purdon 1977).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
83. 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 63.02 (14th ed. 1975).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 93. Section 57 entitled Proof and Allowance of Claims sets forth, inter
alia, the procedure for filing a claim. Subsection (j), however, sets forth those claims that
are not allowable.
85. 9 ERC 1957 (N.D. Calif. 1977).
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dressed the issue of dischargeability of a debt. Section 17(a)8 of the
Bankruptcy Act states that a discharge in bankruptcy releases a
bankrupt from all his provable debts, whether allowable in full or
in part, subject to the exceptions found in section 17. If, however, a
penalty is not dischargeable since it is not provable then the debtor,
subsequent to the discharge, would still have to pay the penalty.
The Marcus court cited Matter of Abramson"7 as authority. In
Abramson, New York State recovered a judgment against Shaver-
town Creamery Company for violation of a state law in selling skim
milk without identifying it as such on the label. Later, the state
brought another action seeking similar monetary penalties. The co-
partners were adjudicated bankrupt individually and as co-
partners. Thereafter, the debtors petitioned the federal district
court to stay New York from collecting the judgment or prosecuting
the section action. The Abramson court, upon which Marcus relied,
said:
It must be admitted that on the face of things this argument
[that the judgment for penalty is provable and therefore dis-
chargeable] is logical. However, the provisions under consider-
ation are not wholly harmonious and we would not come to a
conclusion so against public policy as that Congress intended
bankrupts to be released from all liability for violating laws
passed to protect the health of the community unless abso-
lutely compelled to do so.
The Abramson Court continued:
Reading the two sections together, we think that judgments for
penalties are not debts which can be proved or allowed as such
because they are not for a fixed liability, but that any pecuni-
ary loss the lawmaker has sustained by the act out of which the
penalty arose, together with actual and reasonable costs and
interests, may be proved because of the provision in section 57j.
So construed the act is perfectly reasonable. The lawmaker
who has suffered no pecuniary loss is not permitted to share in
the assets of the estate with creditors who have. On the other
86. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a). This section is made applicable to Chapter XI proceedings by the
express language of 11 U.S.C. §,771.
87. 210 F. 878 (2d Cir. 1914).
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hand, bankrupts who have violated laws passed for the public
good cannot escape punishment by going into bankruptcy.18
On that basis, the Marcus court concluded Abramson controlled on
the issue of provability. "Provable" judgments in proceedings in-
volving environmental actions will thus consist of those judgments
which compensate for actual damages and reasonable costs and
interests.
The next issue in Marcus thus logically became the allowability
of the judgment involved, which under section 57(j) required a de-
termination by the court as to whether the statute involved was
punitive or compensatory in nature. The court concluded that the
penalty label itself was not determinative and it was not easy to tell
whether a liability came within the statute;"9 but if the statutory
basis for the penalty has a punitive or deterrent purpose, then sec-
tion 57(j) would apply. The court concluded that since no part of
the judgment represented pecuniary loss sustained, it was not allow-
able.
Marcus stands for two propositions: (1) criminal penalties are
penal in nature and therefore should not be dischargeable in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, and (2) insofar as a civil penalty is punitive, it
too will not be dischargeable. The controversy involving the puni-
tive versus the compensatory nature of a civil penalty may necessi-
tate a filing of a complaint pursuant to the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act in order to determine the dischargeability of the debt.
THE FUTURE-THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM AcT5g '1
As of this writing, the existing Bankruptcy Act is being substan-
tially rewritten by Congress. The United States Senate has recently
passed S. 2266, a bill originally introduced by Senator DeConcini
of Arizona on October 31, 1977. The U.S. House of Representatives
presently has before it a compromised bill, H.R. 8200, introduced
on February 8, 1978. Major sections of the bill are worthy of discus-
sion. These include the broadened definition of claims, automatic
88. Id. at 879-80.
89. 9 ERC at 1959 (citing 3 COLWER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 57.22 (14th ed. 1975)).
89.1. The Bankruptcy Reform Act was enacted into law subsequent to the preparation of
this article..Pub. L. No. 95-598, 47 U.S.L.W. 1. However, the following analysis is not affected
by the enactment.
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stays, and the status of penalties, all of which could impact environ-
mental regulation.
The first change reflects the issue of claims. Both bills have
broadened the definition of claims to include right to payment and
the right to an equitable remedy." The House Judiciary Committee
recognized that the definition represented a significant departure
from the existing law." The Committee Report said, "[T]he bill
contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how
remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy
case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy
court."" This broadened definition of claims may force the environ-
mental lawyer to both monitor the bankruptcy court and to file a
claim as to the existence of any statutory obligation when a bank-
ruptcy proceeding is commenced by a regulatee13
While the broadened definition of claim may cause concern for
the state and federal environmental lawyer, another significant pro-
vision regarding the automatic stay may not necessarily inhibit en-
vironmental enforcement efforts. Section 362(b) of both bills cre-
ated exceptions from the rule that the filing of a petition operates
as a stay of judicial and administrative proceedings. The filing of a
petition would not operate as a stay from the "commencement or
continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor,"
....the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding
by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police
or regulatory power, 5 . . .[and] the enforcement of a judgment or
* . . a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or
90. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(4) defines
claim as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach does not
give rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
secured, or unsecured ...
91. HOUSE JuDiciARY REPORT, JUDICIARY REPORT No. 95-959, 95TH CONG., IST SESs., (Sept.
8, 1977) at 309.
92. Id.
93. At any time during a bankruptcy proceeding, a regulatee while conducting its opera-
tion, may cause its operation to violate the environmental laws.
94. Section 362(b)(1).
95. Section 362(b)(4).
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regulatory power." While section 362(b) would not preclude the
issuance of a stay in one of the above situations, it forces the trustee
to move the court into action rather than requiring the stayed party
to request relief from the stay. 6 The conditions upon which a stay
could be granted should be clarified to permit a stay only after
notice and adversary hearing, and only if the petitioner can demon-
strate that "irreparable" injury is both "immediate and great" in
accordance with the Supreme Court's language in Younger v.
Harris.
This philosophy of permitting a governmental unit to proceed also
recognized the priority accorded to the government in collecting a
money judgment." Congress has apparently recognized that a bank-
ruptcy proceeding should not be utilized to thwart a government's
enforcement efforts.
Section 523(a)(7) of the proposed act also contemplates the con-
tinuation of the practice not to allow discharge of fines, penalties
and forfeitures payable to or for the benefit of a governmental unit
that does not represent compensation for actual loss.98
CONCLUSION
While the Bankruptcy Act may, as one of its purposes, give debt-
ors a new opportunity in life unhampered by the pressures of pre-
existing debt," it should not be interpreted to sanction its utiliza-
tion as a mechanism to avoid compliance with the laws passed by
state legislatures and given the blessing of Congress to prevent envi-
ronmental degradation.
The question of whether a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to
act and should act to enjoin a state from enforcing its environmental
laws is far from settled. The proposed act, while not specifically
addressing the question of jurisdiction, provides a mechanism to
exempt a governmental unit from the automatic stay which arises
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, thus permitting a govern-
96. Section 362(b)(5).
97. Id. Since the assets of the debtor are in the possession and control of the bankruptcy
court, and since they constitute a fund out of which all creditors are entitled to share,
enforcement by a governmental unit of a money judgment would give it preferential treat-
ment to the detriment of all other creditors.
98. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 523(a)(7) (1978); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
99. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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mental unit to commence or continue the prosecution of actions to
enforce its police and regulatory powers.
If a state statute merely provides a mechanism to protect an
individual creditor against a discharged bankrupt, it would be de-
clared invalid when construed with the Bankruptcy Act; but, if the
statute's purpose is to protect the public health or safety, then the
statute would not fall. Under the proposed act, the concept of claim
would be drastically broadened. However, if the civil or criminal
judgment represents a punitive fine the proposed act, as the existing
case law illustrates, would not permit the discharge of the fine, if
that fine is not wholly compensatory.
The government environmental lawyer, recognizing the rising in-
cidents of bankruptcy proceedings, must become more aware of the
Bankruptcy Act and its potential ramficiations on environmental
enforcement.

